The construction of national consciousness in the Principality of Serbia was based on the principle of one faith, one nation, one state. As in other countries in the Balkan Peninsula, national policy was aimed at the resettlement of the Muslim population, as a centuries-long ruler of another faith, and the “soft” assimilation of the non-Serbian, primarily Orthodox population. The processes of assimilation were of low intensity, although their strength fluctuated over time, and within them, the processes of acculturation and enculturation of individuals and groups unfolded. Although there is little material on the processes of acculturation and enculturation, and it almost entirely pertains to urban environments, primarily Belgrade, it indicates that during the first half of the 19th century, immigrants were not accepted as integral parts of local communities and were treated as foreigners, including the Serbs who immigrated from southern Hungary, whether they had obtained the citizenship of the Principality of Serbia or not. Some were considered foreigners due to different cultural patterns of life and work, upbringing and education, while others were viewed as outsiders because they did not belong to guilds. Serbian immigrants from southern Hungary, and generally from the Habsburg Monarchy, can be divided into three informal groups: educated immigrants, provisionally termed the elite; entrepreneurs, who were mostly merchants and craftsmen; and a diverse group of others, composed of legal and illegal immigrants of various origin, ranging from peasants to runaway wives and husbands, deserters and wanderers. There is most material about the first group, somewhat less about the second, while based on the preserved material regarding the third group, a clearer picture of the processes of acculturation cannot be obtained. Immigration to the Principality of Serbia in the early decades of its existence was a cultural shock for educated immigrants. The differences between them and the local population of similar social status ranged from the obvious (such as clothing styles and the use of the Slavo-Serbian language, for instance) to subtle cultural standards (attitudes towards superiors and subordinates, rules of polite behaviour and everyday communication, etc.). In such circumstances, some immigrants were not willing to adapt their cultural patterns to the milieu in which they settled, which led to slow acculturation processes, while enculturation was clearly manifested, forcing some immigrants to return to their places of origin. The intensity of enculturation declined in the second half of the 19th century, due to the integration of society based on the strengthening of the idea of the nation, as well as the immigrants’ efforts to have their own cultural standards accepted by their environment as advanced and Western European. This was also influenced by the adoption of such and similar standards of life, work and thought by the domicile groups educated in the West. On the other hand, the cultural policy of the Serbian state also adopted Western European patterns, which facilitated the processes of acculturation of the Serbs who immigrated from southern Hungary.

In 1869, the Serbian national movement announced its foreign policy programme in the Bečkerek Programme. It advocated the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the liberation of the Christian peoples. The leaders of the movement had already dealt with the Eastern question in their works, emphasising that the Ottoman Empire should be replaced by a confederation of Christian nations, which would also promote a balance of power in Europe. In their ideas of confederation, Vojvodina is not specifically mentioned. The idea of a federal, decentralised state and territories with autonomous rights links foreign and domestic policy targets. From 1861 onwards, the Serbian Principality placed a great emphasis on establishing relations with the Hungarian opposition. In these negotiations, the issue of the Serbs in Vojvodina often came up. However, Hungarian liberal politicians opposed the main Serbian demand, the creation of an autonomous Serbian territory, and rejected the federalisation of Hungary. Serbian politicians mainly sought Hungary’s support for their ambitions and did not always strongly represent the interests of Serbs in Hungary. The issue of the rights of Serbs in southern Hungary was raised during the contacts between the Serbian Prince and the Hungarian emigration. However, the emigration did not offer an attractive alternative for the Serbian national movement, and in any case it had no power in Hungary.

Hungarian nobleman and diplomat Benjamin Kállay was appointed in 1882 as the head of the Joint Ministry of Finance of Austria-Hungary, under whose administration Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed. Kállay remained in this position until his death in 1903. During this period, the foundations of Austro-Hungarian policy were laid in all the most important spheres of society, including education and culture. Kállay’s absolutist administration pursued a policy of prohibiting the expression of Serbian national consciousness, including the use of the national name for churches, schools and cultural institutions. From the occupation of the provinces, the authorities took a hostile stance towards confessional schools that educated children in the national spirit, aiming to strengthen state-run schools as much as possible. The resistance and distrust of the Serbs towards state schools stemmed from the fear that they would serve as a tool for the denationalisation of the local population. In addition to purely educational functions, state schools, whether primary or secondary, had a strong educational role in shaping loyal and devoted Austro-Hungarian subjects. Numerous texts were introduced into school textbooks with the aim of emotionally binding students to the Monarchy and the ruling dynasty as much as possible. Historical science was the main field where Bosnian national and cultural uniqueness was to be promoted. In an effort to isolate Bosnia and Herzegovina as much as possible from external influences, the Austro-Hungarian administration strictly controlled the distribution of press from neighboring countries. Among many measures the regime took regarding the construction of Bosnian national consciousness, the issue of language held a special place. A decree of the National Government in 1879 stipulated that the official name of the language would first be Croatian, later called “national” and “Bosnian language”, which caused strong resistance from the Serbian community. Although the Austro-Hungarian administration strongly emphasized its “civilising mission” in the occupied provinces before the European public, the results in the field of education were devastating. According to the 1910 census, approximately 88% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was illiterate.

The history of the Albanian attack on the territories occupied and annexed by Serbia in the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913 is interestingly marginal to both Serbian and Albanian historiographies. Apart from the two Balkan Wars, the First World War and the early years of independent Albania, the events of this armed conflict have only modestly attracted the attention of historians of the two nations. This does not mean, of course, that it has not been summarised and analysed. As for Serbian historiography, it is worth highlighting the classic monograph by Bohumil Hrabak (Arbanaški upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja 1912. do kraja 1915. godine, Vranje, 1988), and on the (Kosovo-)Albanian side, the book by Zekerija Cana (Sozialdemokraokracia serbe dhe çështja shqiptare 1903–1914, Prishtina: Instituti Albanologjik i Prishtinës, 1986). These two publications are of particular interest, since on the one hand their authors researched the same corpus of unpublished archival sources (Arhiv Instituta za istoriju radničkog pokreta Srbije, Arhiv Socijalističke Republike Srbije, Diplomatski arhiv Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove), and on the other hand, they were published at almost the same time. The present lecture aims to respond, based on unpublished Austro-Hungarian archival sources, to two claims that Serbian historiography adopted from contemporary Serbian diplomats in the 1920s. According to one of them, the initiator of the idea and organisation of the attack led by Isa Boletini was not only the IMRO, but also the joint Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, the Ballhausplatz. According to another, Austria-Hungary supported the attack with arms supplies and military officers on the ground. Although during my research in Vienna I found evidence that there were indeed arms transports to the Albanians, and that there were indeed k.u.k. military officers in Albania, these data were not related to the events of the Albanian attack of September 1913. The lecture is based on a book project, which aims to benefit from a Bulgarian reading of Georgi H. Georgiev’s book (Българо-албански политически olitчески отношения, 1908–1915. Sofia: Македонски научен институт, 2022) and to reconstruct the Austro-Hungarian position and interpretation of the history of this armed conflict.